1 I examine the debate over Jessé Souza's interpretation of Brazilian modernization as selective in nature -that is, singular, distinct from the model of modernization inspired by European societies and the United States.
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This historicizing of big things does not preclude the possibility of elaborating valid scientific discourses about societies and their events. In this process of elaborating some kind of 'positivity,' we can perceive subtle but clear differences distinguishing the two authors, Weber and Foucault. It is precisely through these differences that I shall look to isolate my own analytic perspective. First we can observe an initial convergence in the authors' interpretation of social reality: differences should be marked in relation to their identities when it comes to interpreting or describing a particular historical formation of an image of the world, a self-description or a device, in order to make the singularity of the whole appear (the phenomenon posed to difference). It is differences that are emphasized, therefore, not identities. These marked differences retrace the comprehension of phenomenal singularities, the description of the starting point of difference and the interpretation of the singularity of the empirical phenomenon, respectively. However, this initial convergence on a detail -though details are what is most important in these theoriestransforms into a clear conceptual divide when the authors turn to examine the same phenomenon and its analytic premises: modern society.
Unlike Weber, Foucault refused to generalize the discourse on the singularity of the phenomenon, even surreptitiously, although he recognizes its historical and empirical validity. As Paul Veyne (2010: 46) once said: "Leave little facts in peace, but make war on generalizations. As Foucault, this unexpected positivist, vouchsafes no more on this score, let me chance my arm." While Foucault (2002) remained entirely sceptical about the existence of big things from the very beginning to the end of his work, Weber did not recoil from what he saw as a scientific task, namely, the elaboration of generalizing and universal explanations of societies. Here, then, a question arises: when Weber affirms the inexorably universal condition of modern rationality, is he not producing generalizations that deny the phenomenal singularities or underlying perspectival differences? I believe so.
In Weber, this demand for generalization is clearly inscribed in one of his most important methodological concepts, the ideal type, whose central objective is to make a determined singular phenomenon as unequivocal as possible. Through his empirical studies, Weber shows how the comparative analysis of historical formations produces typical concepts: capitalism, Calvinist belief, the theodicy of salvation, and so on. The singular aspects of specific phenomena are multiple. It is left to the researcher to select and emphasize, based on his or her interests and values, which aspects to privilege and which to ignore. Most scholars of Weber's thought tend to conclude that the central interest driving him was understanding the modern phenomenon of rationalization. This concept assumes a key role in his comparative analyses of world religions, in his studies of modern politics, in his essay on music -in sum, throughout his intellectual trajectory. But above all it seems to be a general conclusion of his concerning the phenomenon of western modernity: 908 jessé souza: a relapse into the interpretation of universal modernity?
sociol. antropol. | rio de janeiro, v.07.03: 905 -936, december, 2017 A product of modern European civilization, studying any problem of universal history, is bound to ask himself to what combination of circumstances the fact should be attributed that in Western civilization, and in Western civilization only, cultural phenomena have appeared which (as we like to think) lie in a line of development having universal significance and value (Weber, 2001: xxviii) .
Reading this introductory passage to The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism, it is not difficult to note that the task of conceptual generalization induces the reader, and perhaps Weber himself, to downplay or even ignore the fact that although the phenomenon became universal in its effects and causes, this does not imply that its process of historical constitution has not been contingent and singular. For this very reason, it cannot be comprehended as a metaphysical entity capable of being coupled to other social formations, as though the type of society that becomes constituted at a particular time and place could provide a 'mirror' from which other societies can learn, ignoring the fact that involves processes that require human action, making them unpredictable, contingent and unrepeatable.
It is important to emphasize this point because this Weberian prerogative of defining a generalizing scientific semantics for modern societies has inspired worldviews, sociological theories and political practices that postulate the existence of an ideal and universal model of society to be copied by all other societies worldwide. In the immediate post-war period, sociological, political and economic studies of so-called peripheral societies became consolidated, especially in the United States. These studies were guided by the theory of modernization.
In a nutshell, the theory of modernization argues that the technical and scientific rationalization forged in Europe and the United States would expand to all parts of the world as a model in which other societies would see themselves reflected. Max Weber's general conclusion, the expansion of western rationalization, appears almost as a teleological determination in this context, a naturalization of the inevitable progress of modern reason. Hence the theory of modernization tends to conclude that rationalization came to occupy the place of the universal and universalizable, the impersonal and the objective, the generalizing and decontextualized -that is, the place of what is valoratively ideal to be followed, contrary to what is shown to be contingent, contextual, singular, different, or, put otherwise, what appears to be a deviation, a mistake to be avoided. Reason thus appears as a positive factum of western modernity through which the processes of change developed via the functional differentiation of its institutions, the rationalization of its culture and the personalization of its individuals. This experience, which in Weber's view had an eminently peculiar and situated beginning, acquires an abstract and conditioning form capable of being adapted by other societies in present or future time and space. This conception of modernization as an ideal model to be followed had and still has profound impacts both on the scientific interpretation of Brazil, Schwarz (2014) , it is not the ideas that are out of place, but the place that is ill-suited to the ideas. Much of Brazilian sociology, however, became wrapped up in the notion that societies and their processes and dynamics follow a homogenous and universal line of modernization, such that all of them actualize some essential concepts: individualism, the separation of public and private spheres, liberalism, and so on. Once these commentators perceived that modernization in Brazil proceeded on bases divergent from those considered exemplary, they evaluated this process negatively.
The realization that ideas are not abstractions that can be transplanted from one place to another is clearly formulated by Jessé Souza (2000a) Souza is still aligned with a self-description (in theoretical terms) and a selfaffirmation (in practical and institutional terms) oriented by a particular modern ethos representative of the essence of societies. As a consequence, deconstructing the modern ethos as representative of the essence of human societies seems to me of considerable analytic value, providing that "all the cards are 910 jessé souza: a relapse into the interpretation of universal modernity?
sociol. antropol. | rio de janeiro, v.07.03: 905 -936, december, 2017 placed on the table" -that is, the persistence of its defence does not appear to drift away from the author's true intentions. Not least because he does not seem to be acting against science, nor in favour of "conservative political ideologies,"
by supposing that Brazil actualized the universal demand for modernization on the basis of specific and unique cultural premises.
Why, then, call this process a singular, selective and/or elective modernity or a negative modernity? When talking about modernity in European countries, why do we not speak of the selective modernity of England, France or Germany? This is important to register because Jessé Souza sets out from the premise that Brazil is modern yet, because of the way it was structured around inequality and social exclusion, the country developed the peripheral type of modernity. Now, as already observed, a concept is always affirmed in relation to another that is negated. This being the case, the above concepts require at least some kind of central and positive modernity. The question is: how can an interpretation that attempts to critically reconstruct the specificities of Brazilian modernization, purged of ahistorical explanations frozen in time, end up producing normative formulations that are not so different from the interpretative limitations critiqued previously?
The brief discussion that follows on Jessé Souza's conception of selective modernity takes as its central theoretical premise, as indicated above, the rejection of the ideal of universal modernity and the refocus on the notion that societies, whichever they may be, constitute singular processes of formation at the same time as they generate self-descriptions. Consequently, as I also observed earlier, ultimately it is the main theses of historical sociology that provide the basis for this critical study of Jessé Souza's interpretation. More precisely: it is the critiques developed by Bertrand Badie (1992) Comprehending these details is fundamental, since the argumentative baseline of the most important theorists of the so-called 1930s generation -that is, those who exerted a strong influence on the scientific interpretation and everyday sense of modernity in Brazil -is strikingly cultural in kind. This culturalist perspective, shared by these interpretative approaches, is maintained largely as a result of the way in which Weber's theory of modernity was received in Brazil (Vianna, 1999: 174) . This is explained by how Weber constructed his theory, strongly based on a heuristic comparison of distinct historical realities as a means to discern the set of elements that singularized the advance of the modernizing process of western societies compared to a lower reach of this same process in eastern societies. Unlike the economic emphasis displayed in Marx's approaches, his analysis also focused on the form in which this increas- Such an historical concept, however, since it refers in its content to a phenomenon significant for its unique individuality, cannot be defined according to the formula genus proximum, differentia specifica, but it must be gradually put together out of the individual parts which are taken from historical reality to make it up. Thus the final and definitive concept cannot stand at the beginning of the investigation, but must come at the end. We must, in other words, work out in the course of the discussion, as its most important result, the best conceptual formulation of what we here understand by the spirit of capitalism, that is the best from the point of view which interests us here. This point of view (the one of which we shall speak later) is, further, by no means the only possible one from which the historical phenomena we are investigating can be analysed. [...] The result is that it is by no means necessary to understand by the spirit of capitalism only what it will come to mean to us for the purposes of our analysis. This is a necessary result of the nature of historical concepts which attempt for their methodological purposes not to grasp historical reality in abstract general formulae, but in concrete genetic sets of relations which are inevitably of a specifically unique and individual character (Weber, 2001: 13-14) .
It is this theoretical nominalism, entirely consistent with his methodological premises, that is announced in Weber's texts. However, it is not maintained in his final conclusions, since in the same work Weber (1998: 130) forgets the random historical-cultural events that gave rise to modern formations, particularly capitalism, when he affirms their universally expansive condition.
Perhaps the commentators of Brazilian modernity would not have lost anything in analytic refinement in their appropriation of a classic of Weber's statureespecially when this appropriation is made so in order to compare his ideas with the specific contexts in which they are instrumentalized, if -and only if -they had perceived the critical distance between his nominalist cultural conceptual base and his universalist historical diagnosis. Now, if we encounter in
Weber himself this contradiction that appears to annul the differences in rationalization between cultures on the premise that Protestant asceticism "reshaped the world," it should be no surprise to find a society that describes itself as one that developed a 'backward,' 'peripheral' and 'selective' modernity.
Situating Brazil in the same western civilizing formation as nations like Germany, Britain and France, however, still tells us little about the process by which it became a more modern society, since the sharing of more general and 914 jessé souza: a relapse into the interpretation of universal modernity?
sociol. antropol. | rio de janeiro, v.07.03: 905 -936, december, 2017 universal values does not contribute decisively to shaping societies in symmetric processes of rational standardization of their individual and collective actions. This is also why comparing Brazil with a nation like the United States -presented as an ideal of modernized society in the eyes of its intellectuals and institutionally circulated reaching public opinion -despite its geographic proximity and the development of a degree of synchrony in its processes (the decimation of its native population, slavery and so forth) does not imply that its modernization processes had to occur simultaneously and required identical cultural practices. Not least because substantial differences also exist even among the processes of societies considered models of modernity: Britain, France, Germany, the United States. As Jessé Souza (2000b: 89) reminds us, the latter exerts its difference through its self-description as the bearer of cultural and institutional values the provide a model of modernity.
Given the above, when Weber is invoked in the debate on Brazilian modernity, it is not the complexity of his theory as a whole that is under discussion, nor a critical appraisal of its limits and analytic errors, but the selection of But what takes on a much more important dimension is the fact that these proposals escaped the confines of writing and invaded the physical and symbolic world of government programs (Souza, 2011: 37) . Consequently, describing the analytic use of the concept of modernity informing these self-descriptive tendencies of Brazil -its flawed modernity and its unparalleled singularity -can help reveal their valorative motivations and their scientific misconceptions.
While the inspiration for these authors, especially Jessé Souza, from whom we shall develop the argument of selective modernity, is the Weberian notion of modernity, it makes little sense to resort to this kind of formulation.
According to Jessé Souza (2000a) happens in the most diverse ways possible: here it suffices to recall that we do not need the rationalized culture of Calvinist communities to develop a certain pattern of subjective (internal) and objective rationalization (on the way to institutionalization) during the period of the rise of cities in the Medieval west (Weber, 2002) . It was cities that promoted civil autonomy, non-legitimized democracy and trade, mainly through the rationalization of religious practices.
But even so, Italian cities evolved in a different way to French and English cities, though they were equally moving towards an increased and more complex rationalization of their practical and theoretical domains. When this moment was partially suspended due to the emergence of the patriarchal and patrimonial State in all these cities, Weber does not refer to the 'delay' in the process of rationalization, but rather to the selection of ideals that informed the social, economic and political interests of dominant groups in the social hierarchy.
On this point, indeed, Jessé Souza has highlighted the fundamental question in Weber: the historical process invariably occurs as a process of domination and is simultaneously accompanied by a process of legitimization of the latter;
although they do not happen in a planned or intentional form, the contingencies are, in each case, completed by an internal logic that designs and redesigns the general and specific framework of societies. In all events, while there exists this selectivity in the cultural processes actualizing the cognitive patterns of development, Weber at no point in his argument needed to emphasize that in suchand-such society modernity was selective, or more or less selective than in other societies. Being selective is precisely how cultures follow their course. This being so, it would not be a peculiarity that in the United States, for instance, a more ample and quicker rationalization of society was selected even before the State emerged; or that in England selection involved a more concomitant evolution of these two spheres. In sum, being selective is a characteristic inherent to every of all the cultural realizations of western modernity, spanning from the competitive capitalist market to the liberal democratic State, and passing through the free press, rational scientific discussion, the doctrine of subjective rights and any of the other gains or positive aspects that we may imagine stemming from the passage from traditional to modern society (Souza, 2000a: 254, original italics In a certain sense, however, selectivity does not seem to be merely a discontinuity provoked by the modernizing revolution at the beginning of the nineteenth century.
It has a secular connection, five-hundred years old, with the Islamic slavery that became established here. After all, the subordinate who adheres to his father's values will still be the only one to be rewarded with benefits and favours. With modernization these values undoubtedly transformed from personal to impersonal in a shift from the traditional European father represented by the Portuguese to the impersonal father of the capitalism brought by European nations at the forefront of this process, but something of the initial logic is maintained (Souza, 2000a: 266, original 
italics).
It seems difficult to argue with the assertion that Brazil is modern -and modern not just in superficial appearance, but in its social structures. The idea that patriarchalism was a formative dimension of Brazil superseded by the rise 920 jessé souza: a relapse into the interpretation of universal modernity?
sociol. antropol. | rio de janeiro, v.07.03: 905 -936, december, 2017 of some mulatos to higher social strata, however, is an interpretation that overlooks an important aspect of Weber's theory of domination. According to this theory, an intrinsic part of the central power of the patrimonialist state, and consequently the patriarchalist state as well, is to promote members of lower strata due to their greater willingness to obey than those belonging to the higher strata. And this was a demand from the other side of the process of patrimonialist domination -that is, from the forms of legitimization created to maintain its power. A discussion of how social stratification produces ideas and processes that legitimize domination is, of course, fundamental to understanding any social formation, particularly the Brazilian formation whose structure of stratification is still strongly linked to the patriarchalist model. This being the case, it seems to me that Souza's argument -when focused, particularly in A modernização seletiva, on the claim that patriarchalism's culture of 'favours' provided the basis for the modernizing revolution in Brazil -wants of a more refined and critical analysis.
At this point in the argument it is useful to return to Souza's conception of modernization in order to comprehend this limit to his critique. In using the expression selective modernity, Souza obviously does not mean that the historical process, whichever it may be, involves a conscious, rational and planned 'selection' of certain elements at the expense of many others deemed less important. On the contrary, his aim is to salvage the sense of contingency, contextuality and chance intrinsic to the history of societies. Souza takes this insight, one of incalculable heuristic value and displaying a profound sensibility towards history, from Norbert Elias, who, in the majority of his texts, stressed the selective nature of the civilizational process. This can be perceived through the difference between Elias and Weber, as Souza (2000a: 43) highlights. Unlike Weber, who invests in the comparison between western societies and the rest, emphasizing the advancing rationalization and simultaneously waning irrationalization in the former, Elias is concerned with stressing a certain persistence of civilizing development coordinated by the requirements of privilege and distinction (Souza, 2000a: 49) . Various possibilities exist for accessing modernity, therefore, keeping in mind that rationalization, rather than assuming the lead role, becomes dependent on the way in which each figuration (each society) develops the relation between social constraint and habitus. In this sense, contrary to an interpretation that posits rationalization as the inescapable direction of history and rationality as the ultimate meaning of civilization -so particular to Weber's analyses -Elias flatly refuses to understand western development as a homogenous, universal or unambiguous standard for the rest of the world, functioning as its cultural mirror. Instead, paradoxically, he emphasizes its concrete, specific and selective formations -that is, its processes of civilizing modernization. (Elias, 1994; Bourdieu, 2011) . This is a lesson that Jessé Souza explores with acumen. However, as Orlando Villas-Bôas Filho astutely pointed out, 9 his decision to adopt Freyre's interpretation of the transition from patriarchalism to modernization through the selective process of hybrid slavery (Souza, 2000a: 242) , which suggests that the master had 'allowed' the revolutionary rise of the mulato to the middle strata of society, seems to lead him to forget that historical processes are not permitted nor even made possible by the group in a position to impose the measure of society. In my view, it is the reverberation of Freyre's conclusions in Souza's work that cause the latter to deviate from a truly critical comprehension of Brazilian modernity since they tend to obscure one of the most important analytic premises of his critical sociology: societies and their processes of constitution result from conflicts of interests and ideas between groups competing for social control. Thus an important event in a society, like a modification in the system of social stratification, cannot be simply understood as a 'negotiation,' a greater 'benevolence' or even a greater 'kindness' of one social stratum vis-à-vis another (Souza, 2000b: 244) .
In truth, if we take the critical details of Souza's conception of modernity as a baseline, especially his perception that social processes are based on unequal social relations, it would be much more productive to draw inspiration from (Blaj, 1998: 31; Dias, 1998: 22) enabled the understanding that the formative processes of societies are discontinuous and subject to profound alterations, precluding the idea of permanent values; 3) this vision provided him with a critical perspective later amply developed with the reading of Brazilian modernity as one that became structured around social inequalities; 4) the structuring of inequalitiesone of the central issues of Brazilian modernity -that resulted from the high concentration of wealth, power and culture, and developed in the traditionalist past, made it difficult, in his view, to accentuate the modern world at the expense of the traditionalist world of slavery and the landed aristocracy; 5) this past rooted in hierarchies and privileges allowed Brazil to successfully naturalize social inequalities; 6) finally, the process of modernization and Brazilian modernity did not take place, however, without social conflicts and political struggles; 10 there was an internal demand to redefine existing social structures and power relations.
My point can be summarized as follows: like Gilberto Freyre, Buarque de Holanda looked to learn from Brazil's conditioning cultural factors without considering them to be a priori forms of armour plating that were impossible to divest later. Buarque de Holanda's analyses include an essential proviso, announced above, namely that the social formation of the Brazilian past constituted a particular social structure of inequality and exclusion that makes it difficult for Brazil to become stabilized as an effectively modern country -but I stress difficult, not impossible. This is important to note because not just Jessé Souza, but a whole spectrum of contemporary authors 11 set out from the premise that Brazil is modern, but that, die to its structuring around the inequality of economic, social and cultural conditions, it developed the selective, peripheral and even negative type of modernity. This critical analysis is amply explored in A ralé brasileira: quem é e como vive (Souza, 2011) and in A tolice da inteligência brasileira: ou como o país se deixa manipular pela elite (Souza, 2015) . These books generally seem to continue his what mechanisms lead to the formation of the socially numerous group of people living on the edge of the economic and moral preconditions needed to compete for the 'best places' in all kinds of social, political, economic and cultural spaces?
This form in which Brazilian society is structured -that is, through the distinction between one class, the ralé, the riffraff, "excluded from all physical and sym-923 article | edilene leal bolic opportunities and all the other social classes that are, albeit differentially, included" -results in the main obstacle for Brazil to become an effectively modern country. What interests me in Souza's analysis, especially here, is his discussion of the causes of this limit to Brazil's modernity: rejecting the explanation of the Iberian origin developed by the authors of the 'sociology of inauthenticity,'
he develops the thesis of 'selective modernity,' according to which the Brazilian process of modernization was devoid of a traditional morality comparable to the morality that structured the European societies and was shaped by a recent past of slavery that still has living implications in the present. Souza discusses this thesis in detail in order to stress the fact that, here in Brazil, certain aspects were privileged in detriment to others, for example, the personal aspect in detriment to the impersonal (Souza, 2000a: 258) , the specific type of "Islamic slavery associated with the peculiarity of the essential inhumanity of the slave," despite the type of slavery effected by American modernization and the like. In A ralé brasileira he writes:
Rather than the classic opposition between workers and the bourgeoisie, what we have here, in a peripherally modern society like Brazil's, as our 'central conf lict,' both social and political, one that overrides the importance of all others, is the opposition between a class excluded from all physical and symbolic opportunities for social recognition and all the other social classes that are included, albeit differentially. While Brazilian society remains oblivious to this challenge, we shall always be moderns in appearance only, a faltering, unjust modernity, pettily economic and economicist (Souza, 2011: 25) .
It is impossible not to agree with Jessé Souza (2011: 25) concerning the need for us to develop "a radically new perception of the central problems that challenge Brazil as a society." However, while the perception must be radically new, we cannot simply repeat the old concepts and analyses in different guises, including here the concept of selective modernity, which repeats the same normative and idealized dimension of universal modernity criticized by the author himself. Bertrand Badie (1992: 344) argues that one possible explanation for the difficulty that sociology, historical sociology included, faces when trying to escape this historical shortfall in the interpretation of so-called dependent societies derives from the fact that these societies:
are marked by the overlapping of two histories and, in addition, two constructions of time: their own and that of the western world. The social dynamic of dependent societies is deeply marked by this duality: the importation of practices and modelspolitical, economic and social -is equivalent, at the same time, to the importance of another history and also leads to the coexistence of two histories.
From the viewpoint of his interpretation of Brazil's process of modernity, Jessé Souza positions himself a resolute critic of this importation of a universal ideal, stressing that every society, including Brazil, obeys its own individualities, its own idiosyncrasies, the specific actions and practices that 924 jessé souza: a relapse into the interpretation of universal modernity?
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he also rejects the idea that the present or future of a society -the structuring of its social dynamic, its culture and its politics -results necessarily or dialectically from its past. He thus rejects the idea that Brazil is not modern because of its Iberian past. From the viewpoint of his interpretation of how the Brazilian social dynamic, its institutions and social systems, is structured, however, we can observe that Souza makes the same kind of mistakes that, Badie (1992: 346) suggests, we find in other thinkers from historical sociology like Theda Skocpol and Perry Anderson -notably the theoretical mistake of thinking that Brazilian modernity is defective (or deficient or negative) because its social dynamic is marked by social inequality, which, unlike other societies with which it is compared, is so extreme that it impedes the normalized establishment of modern 
